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The grand event on One Belt One Road (officially termed as the Belt and Road 
Forum) kicked off in Beijing this may, amidst a global fanfare witnessing participants 
from around 130 nations, along with 29 heads of states, notably from Russia and 
Turkey. Despite official representation from the US and other powers registering their 
presence, India’s conspicuous absence from the event did not go unseen by the hosts. 
As it is known, New Delhi’s opposition to OBOR stemmed from its repeated protests 
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over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which passes through what India terms 
as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Further, China’s deepening ties with Pakistan 
and its plans to extend linkages to the entire Euro-Asian and African territorial and 
maritime landscapes under OBOR have been received by India with concern, given 
the long-term geostrategic designs Chinese are known to have planned over the years. 
 
While transnational connectivity has remained at the forefront of all pro-globalization 
models, the concerns regarding the long-term impact of OBOR projects stem from the 
way Beijing has viewed its international economic ventures with strategic foresight. 
Among the numerous leading Chinese geo-strategists, the writings of Wang Jisi 
(especially his seminal piece in Foreign Affairs) are worth drawing upon, if one has 
to get a sense of China’s grand strategy in brief, where he summed up China’s long-
term agenda in conclusion, which could be interpreted as something that challenges 
the very foundations of liberal international economic order. “If the international 
community appears not to understand China's aspirations, its anxieties, and its 
difficulties in feeding itself and modernizing, the Chinese people may ask themselves 
why China should be bound by rules that were essentially established by the Western 
powers. China can rightfully be expected to take on more international 
responsibilities”, wrote Jisi. 
 
If the events leading to the formal launch of OBOR event are to be interpreted in the 
context discussed above, some clear interpretations could be easily derived. 
Foremostly, OBOR coincides with a gradual retreat of Washington from Asian geo-
economic sphere, whose signs were noticeable under the Obama presidency and 
attained further clarity under that of President Trump. The Obama 
administration’s “Asia Pivot” policy, which manifested in a hard negotiated Trans-
Pacific Partnership trade agreement (among 12 nations 
controlling approximately 40% of the global GDP) signed in 2016, was later quashed 
by the Trump administration as a result of its commitment to the promised inward-
oriented development model to divert more resources to the US economy. At the 
moment, while there are no signs of Washington implementing any responsive 
strategy against OBOR, there are indications that India, and to a large extent Japan 
have counter strategies on the anvil. 
 
Specifically, the ongoing Sino-Indian rivalry and India’s disenchanted response to 
OBOR does offer some insights into New Delhi’s China policy which may seem 
contradictory but does exhibit a noticeable pattern of how it is preparing to respond. 
While New Delhi maintains that CPEC’s passage through PoK as a violation of its 
sovereignty, India’s opposition to OBOR seems to have surpassed this territorial 
domain. That is, with the sovereignty issues notwithstanding, New Delhi’s official 
strategic circles have been consideringOBOR’s long term agendas while designing 
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India’s response strategy.  Two aspects of New Delhi’s response pattern need to be 
highlighted in this regard, namely, a “rhetorical response” criticizing OBOR and 
second, an alternative economic vision to compete with the OBOR.  
 
Ever since the announcement of the OBOR event, statements by the Indian Foreign 
Office depict an aggressive posturing vis-à-vis China, which was hitherto a domain of 
New Delhi’s unofficial hawkish camp. This stance is also reminiscent of the NAM era 
Moralpolitik, when New Delhi frequently took the international fora to “shame” the 
warring superpower camps, while at the same time extracting politico-economic 
concessions from the both the power blocs. Although India’s opposition to OBOR 
comes from the CPEC, its criticism of OBOR has gone beyond CPEC and rather 
targeted China’s hidden ambitions behind the project. One recent statement by 
Indian foreign office’s spokesperson is worth noticing in this regard: 
 
“We are of the firm belief that connectivity initiatives must be based on universally 
recognized international norms, good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency, 
and equality. Connectivity initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility 
to avoid projects that would create unsustainable debt burden for communities; 
balanced ecological and environmental protection and preservation standards; 
transparent assessment of project costs; and skill and technology transfer to help long 
term running and maintenance of the assets created by local communities”…[and] 
initiatives must follow principles of financial responsibility to avoid projects that 
would create an unsustainable debt burden for communities”. 
 
Clearly, New Delhi targeting the nature of Chinese projects alludes to a change of 
stance where it has not shied away from questioning Chinese intentions, a significant 
departure from the erstwhile policy of limiting its criticism of OBOR running through 
PoK.  
 
The second aspect, which too, has gained traction after the OBOR event, depicts 
India’s broader strategic vision to counter OBOR by teaming up with Japan. By 
questioning OBOR, New Delhi has also sought to generate goodwill (since there have 
been growing voices of criticism against the exploitative nature of Chinese projects) 
regarding the alternative connectivity project it has recently floated with 
Japan, namely the “Asia-Africa growth corridor”. The project, whose outline had 
been formulated during in the India-Japan joint declaration during PM Modi’s visit 
to Japan last year, was formally announced a few days after the OBOR event via a 
vision document. The project, which is expected to receive $200 billion worth 
funding from Japan is being projected as a more “inclusive” initiative, with the 
terminology seeming directed against Chinese projects. 
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While it is too early to figure how far India would succeed in building a strong 
counter-narrative against OBOR through its diplomatic channels and economic clout, 
it is clear that it stands prepared with a sound policy to deal with China. With this 
two-pronged response strategy, it still remains to be seen how successfully New Delhi 
is able to formulate its counter-narrative against the OBOR. 
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